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It is a common place in the literature that the Muslim 
Brotherhood (jama’a al-ikhwan al-muslimin) is - after 
its re-emergence on the political scene back in the 
seventies - the main (if not the only) real, organised 
and mass-based opposition force in Egypt. Events in 
Egypt in January 2011 have recast attention on this 
question. This paper aims to evaluate, inasmuch as it 
is possible, the state of health of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) today, after forty years of co-
existence with the Egyptian (neo)-authoritarian 
regime. Has the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
represented a real alternative to the incumbent 
regime? Or it is more correct to speak today in terms 
of an almost ‘functional’ opposition, tamed by 
recurring political repression and limited freedom of 
action? To what extent has the Muslim Brotherhood 
been able to shape or at least to influence the 
Egyptian political and social agenda, both with 
respect to the regime and to other opposition forces? 
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Is There an Islamist Alternative in Egypt? 
  






It is a common place in the literature that the Muslim Brotherhood (jama’a al-ikhwan al-
muslimin) is - after its re-emergence on the political scene back in the seventies - the 
main (if not the only) real, organised and mass-based opposition force in Egypt. Events 
in Egypt in January 2011 have recast attention on this question. While the illegal status 
of the Brotherhood and Egypt’s authoritarian setting do not allow for accurate 
quantitative analyses, the above assertion almost certainly holds true. Yet, it probably 
tells more about the weakness of Egyptian opposition in general than about the 
strength of the Brotherhood itself. 
 
This paper aims to evaluate, inasmuch as it is possible, the state of health of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) today, after forty years of co-existence with the Egyptian 
(neo)-authoritarian regime characterised by “deepening authoritarian rule masked by 
limited and reversible liberalization” and by “political demobilization enforced by varying 
degrees of naked coercion” (Beinin 2009: 21). 
 
Has the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood represented a real alternative to the incumbent 
regime? Or it is more correct to speak today in terms of an almost ‘functional’ 
opposition, tamed by recurring political repression and limited freedom of action? To 
what extent has the Muslim Brotherhood been able to shape or at least to influence the 
Egyptian political and social agenda, both with respect to the regime and to other 
opposition forces? 
 
To answer these and similar questions, we will analyse the recent evolution (1990- 
January 2011) of this Islamist organisation, focusing on: 
 
1) The Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship to the regime 
The MB is the main opposition force in Egypt, but it has generally kept a moderate 
approach towards the political establishment. This ‘accommodating’ strategy has, on 
the one hand, allowed the Islamist organization to survive and even flourish in certain 
periods but, on the other, it has exposed it to accusations of undue compromise with 
the regime and lack of political initiative. The Brotherhood’s relationship to the regime 
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2) The nature and extent of the Muslim Brotherhood’s social programme and activities 
The Muslim Brotherhood is well known for its widespread and efficient social activities 
which are considered to be the key to the Islamists’ success in popular mobilization in 
contrast with the regime’s lack of legitimacy due to the unfulfilled promises of the post-
independence social pact, let alone of the neo-liberal era. Today, increasing poverty 
and social inequalities are emerging as one of the most challenging issues of Egyptian 
politics and the MB may - at least in theory - be better placed than other political actors 
to capitalise on social discontent. However, cyclical repression and political stagnation 
seem to have affected the Brotherhood’s social action as well and their ability to 
formulate a clear social project. 
 
 
1. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime 
 
The traditional position of the Muslim Brotherhood towards the regime has always been 
one of no direct confrontation. Following the jama’a’s founding principles, the 
achievement of political power should be postponed until the time is ripe, that is to say 
until society has been truly Islamized and prepared for an Islamic government. The 
search for power would otherwise not lead to an Islamic state and could also negatively 
affect the internal functioning of the organization and its public image. This general 
principle was briefly contested in the second half of the ‘40s when the Egyptian liberal 
regime was coming to an end. However, it was reinforced again in the ‘70s and ‘80s: 
The ‘new’ Muslim Brotherhood which emerged from the ashes of Nasserism kept a 
moderate and, at times, even compliant approach towards the regime, which has never 
been put into question seriously until today. The regime never allowed the Islamist 
organization to be legalized and periodically limited its political and social activities, but 
cleverly capitalised on the Brotherhood’s willingness to compromise and on its 
conservative social programme, both to increase its own popular legitimacy, by 
allowing for some kind of mass opposition, and at the same time to marginalize secular 
opposition. 
 
In the first decade of his presidency (1981-1990), Mubarak allowed the Brotherhood to 
flourish and reach what is probably the peak of the jama’a presence in society after the 
golden age of the 30s and ‘40s. The MB consolidated its presence in student 
organizations, participated in parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987 and won 
elections in the main professional syndicates (doctors, scientists, engineers, lawyers, 
etc.) (al-Awadi 2004; Wickham 2002). Also, as we will illustrate in more detail in the 
next section, it consolidated its social presence through the establishment of an 
efficient network of charities linked to private (ahly) mosques. 
 
It was in the early nineties that the honeymoon with the regime ended, to be only 
partially and briefly re-established between 2000 and 2005. By the mid-nineties, the 
Brotherhood was effectively ousted or at least its presence seriously limited in all 
significant professional syndicates and in Parliament and thousands of its members 
were imprisoned (Kienle 2001: 131-170). However, the MB was not completely erased 
from the political scene as happened during the Nasser years and maintained its role of 
main opposition force. The regime’s aim was, in fact, to reduce and keep the 
Brotherhood’s public space and political/social impact under control, not to get rid of it 
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This was the situation of the Brotherhood and the regime when Egypt entered the 
decade of ‘Arab reformism’, initiated mainly by US pressure after 9/11 and facilitated by 
a sudden awakening of Arab public opinion in reaction to the deterioration of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (2000 onwards) and to the Iraq war (2003). In Egypt, the reformist 
debate acted as a catalyst for the opposition’s mobilization on the issue of succession 
to the old and probably sick Husni Mubarak. 
 
A first wave of mobilization took place in the years 2004-2005, facilitated by 
presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2005. In 2004, the opposition 
started, in an unprecedented move, to directly criticize the Mubarak family and ask for 
an end to the emergency law (in place since 1981), for the facilitation of procedures for 
the legalization of political parties and, above all, for multi-candidate presidential 
elections, thus making an important shift from the regime-friendly demonstrations 
focused on foreign issues (Palestine, Iraq) that took place in 2002-2003. 
 
The democratic reform euphoria also influenced the MB, which brought out a more 
explicit reformist political programme, namely in a document released in March 2004.1 
The Brothers actively participated in the many opposition demonstrations and events 
until the summer of 2005, often determining their success at least in terms of popular 
participation. However, the political initiative of that period was not in the hands of 
Islamists, rather it was the game of new entries onto the Egyptian political scene, such 
as the well-known Egyptian Movement for Change or the newly legalized Tomorrow 
Party (al-Ghad) of Ayman Nour, which managed to compensate for their lack of a 
meaningful social basis with effective slogans and efficient media campaigns both 
domestically and at the international level. The political slogan that hit the newspaper 
headlines at that time was not ‘Islam is the solution’ or any other ‘ikhwani’ mot d’ordre, 
but ‘kefaya!’ (enough!) the slogan with which the Egyptian Movement for Change came 
to be known in Egypt and abroad. Indeed, the Kefaya Manifesto became the common 
platform for the so called intifada al-islah or the reform protest of all opposition forces. 
 
In February 2005, Mubarak reacted to the opposition’s requests by announcing the 
amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution, introducing presidential multi-candidate 
elections for the first time in Egyptian history.2 The Muslim Brotherhood, together with 
other opposition forces, denounced the constitutional amendments as cosmetic and 
called for a boycott of the May referendum convened to approve the new norms (Arafat 
2009: 173; El Amrani 2005). Yet, they carefully skirted the issue of presidential 
elections to be held only a few months later in September 2005, publicly encouraging 
their members to vote as their consciences dictated, a move which has been 
interpreted as not-so-tacit support for Mubarak. A similar lack of coherence was 
demonstrated by other important opposition parties, such as the Wafd and al-Ghad, 
                                                 
1
 The Muslim Brotherhood Initiative for Reform, Declared in Syndicate of Journalists, 3 March 2004. For an 
Italian translation of the Arabic text, see Guazzone (2005: 407-421).  
2
 The amended Article 76 lays out two paths to presidential candidacy: the first through membership in a 
party, provided that the party has been in existence for at least 5 consecutive years and has at least 3% of 
the seats in Parliament. The second is for “independents,” who must obtain the signatures of at least 250 
elected officials from the Parliament and municipal councils, which are completely controlled by the 
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which filed their no-chance-to-win candidates for the presidential elections immediately 
after having boycotted the May referendum. 
 
Some observers argued that the Brotherhood’s success at the parliamentary elections 
later that year (the MB obtained 88 seats or 20%, a record not only for Islamists, but for 
the opposition in general) was the regime’s reward for not boycotting the presidential 
elections and, in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood had organised their electoral campaign 
in a particularly tolerant atmosphere that lasted till the first day of election.3 Only after 
the Islamists' positive results in the first provinces that voted became clear, did the 
regime ignite the repression machine, which became even harsher after the elections 
(El Amrani 2005; ICG 2008). 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success had probably gone too far. In the following 
years, the jama’a suffered from what has been labelled the worst repression cycle 
since the Nasser years. Thousands of militants were arrested and the Brotherhood was 
not allowed to participate in municipal elections in 2008, while the regime launched a 
smear campaign portraying the Brotherhood to domestic elites and foreign partners as 
an organization of Nazis and Talibans. To foreign partners the message was clear: if 
liberalization is too fast, you won’t get a more democratic Egypt, but an Islamic one. 
More importantly, the Islamist organization’s financial base was also hit by the arrest of 
businessmen and financiers whose combined investment was estimated at around 
USD 4 billion (al-Anani 2007). 
 
From 2006 to 2010, the regime managed successfully to curb the Islamists’ political 
influence, thus demonstrating once again that it was perfectly able to control the space 
allowed the Brotherhood. 
 
In 2007, the MB declared - for the first time since its establishment in 1928 - their 
intention to form a full-fledged political party, the programme of which was leaked to the 
media by the independent newspaper al-Masry al-Youm. The programme, though not 
officially recognised by the Brotherhood’s leadership, was much criticized for being a 
step back with respect to the March 2004 Reform Initiative (Brown et al. 2008). 
Observers and academia saw the 2007 party platform as the end of the Brotherhood 
‘reformist’ experiment, with more so-called ‘grey areas’ or points of ambiguity in the 
Brothers’ democratic ‘conversion,’ probably to be ascribed to the old guard of salafis 
inside the organization, thus reinforcing the position of those advocating the theoretical 
incompatibility between Islamism (or even Islam) and liberal democracy. 
 
However, the ambiguities in the Muslim Brotherhood’s political programme point more 
to the organization’s unwillingness or inability to build a real and solid alternative to the 
current regime, leaving - as already stated - the initiative to much weaker (in terms of 
social basis and organizational capacity) opposition forces, such as Kefaya or, since 
2010, Muhammad al-Baradei, etc. 
 
Two main factors undermine the Brotherhood’s credibility and efficacy or its capacity to 
dictate the terms of the political debate without always being on the defensive. First of 
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all, the authoritarian environment, implying cyclical repression and limitations to the 
freedom of action, has had the effect of ossifying internal debate and potential 
disagreement. The MB - not dissimilarly from the ruling National Democratic Party - is 
not a coherent political organization, but rather a sum of different political trends that in 
a more open political context would certainly split into different political organizations or 
parties. What is the point of splitting up over the question of forming a political party, if 
that party will not be allowed to run in elections anyway?4 The authoritarian 
environment has thus had the paradoxical effect of preserving both the ruling National 
Democratic Party and the main opposition representative, the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
organizations united by their lack of serious external competitors in their respective 
spheres. 
 
A second and probably more central factor is the inherent contradiction of the 
Brotherhood’s programme since its founding: should the regime be considered 
legitimate or illegitimate? Considering it illegitimate would of course imply direct 
confrontation and the risk of being completely erased from the political arena. 
Accepting the regime as legitimate, however, could also pose some risks. Could the 
Brotherhood accept the rules of the game imposed by the regime for 40 years without 
losing credibility and political coherence in the eyes of its constituency? This dilemma - 
faced by all opposition forces when operating in an authoritarian setting - reappeared in 
the new round of parliamentary elections in November-December 2010. In the 
parliamentary elections, the regime made it perfectly clear after five years of heavy 
repression that it would not allow the Muslim Brotherhood to repeat the electoral 
success of 2005. Still the Brotherhood did not budge from its traditional position of 
participation, ignoring the fact that any form of participation in elections that are held in 
an unfair environment is tantamount to an endorsement of the regime.5 Together with 
the legal and regime-loyal opposition (the liberal Wafd and the leftist Tagammu’), the 
MB did not adhere to Muhammad al-Baradei’s call for a boycott of the parliamentary 
elections. In the case of the MB and even more so of the Wafd, participation was seen 
as an attempt to appease the regime, as well as a reflection of the fact that despite its 
limitations, parliament can serve opposition groups as a platform from which to reach 
out to the media and claim some leadership roles. However, the secular and regime-
loyal opposition represented by the Wafd and the Tajammu’ had more reason, at least 
in theory, to participate as the prospects of getting a few seats were much better than 
those of their Islamist rivals. As it turned out, participation did not pay off as the election 
results were even worse than the Brotherhood (or perhaps even the regime6) predicted. 
                                                 
4
 This is probably the case of people such as Abd el-Moneim Abu al-Futuh, representative of the so called 
‘reformist trend’, who is fully convinced of the futility of splitting up the mother organization after the al-
wasat experience in the 1990s. Author’s interviews with Abd el-Moneim Abu al-Futuh, Abu Ela Madi (al-
Wasat), Hussam Tammam (independent analyst), Cairo, November 2010. 
5
 See, for instance, Essam El-Erian interview with Michel Dunne (31 May 2010) 
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/01/interview-with-essam-al-arian. There was of 
course some internal disagreement, but the Brotherhood remained firm on the position expressed by its 
spokeperson. Author’s interviews with MB activists, November 2010, Cairo. See also Amr Hamzawy, “the 
Brotherhood enters elections in a weakened state”, al-Masry al-Youm, 17/11/2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/opinion/brotherhood-enters-elections-weakened-state. 
6
 The paradox underlined by various observers of the Egyptian political scene is that the election results 
are not completely positive for the NDP as they have too little opposition for next year’s presidential 
election to be legitimized. Michelle Dunne, “From Too Much Egyptian Opposition, to too little”, al-Masry al-
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The Muslim Brotherhood got no seat in the first round and finally decided to boycott the 
December 5 run-off election together with the Wafd. 
 
From the foregoing, the Muslim Brotherhood emerges as a moderate reformist force 
willing to compromise with and not fundamentally challenge the regime. The result is a 
loss of initiative of the Brotherhood, which is still the main opposition force in the 
country but runs the risk of losing credibility as an alternative to the regime, suffering as 
it does from the same diseases as the other regime-loyal opposition forces. 
 
 
2. The Muslim Brotherhood and social action 
 
It could be argued however that, quite differently from other opposition forces, the MB 
is not just a political organization but also has an important or even preponderant social 
component. In view of the political repression of the last five years, the Brotherhood 
started refocusing its attention on its da’wa activities, that is to say proselytism and 
social work. The election of Muhammad al-Badie’, a conservative, as the new general 
guide in January 2010 was widely interpreted as a sign of this ‘retreat from politics’ 
(Hamzawy et al. 2010). But what are the Brotherhood’s social activities and social 
project? Has the political repression of the last 15 years or so affected the social 
(charitable) side of the organization? 
 
Considering the importance of social action for Islamist mass movements of which the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is the prototype or mother organization, it is surprising to 
note that there is no updated study on the state of the Brotherhood’s social activities in 
Egypt. Most of the studies on the MB take for granted that (1) the organization has a 
large social basis and (2) that this social basis mainly comes from its efficient network 
of charities providing popular services in health and education. Additionally, it is 
assumed that precisely this social charities network is the most important challenge the 
Islamists pose to the state-regime in Egypt, as elsewhere. According to this view, 
Islamists could ‘easily’ decide to abandon their strictly political activities to concentrate 
on social work and da’wa. 
 
Indeed, social action linked to a project of social justice was a central feature of the 
Brotherhood until the ‘40s (Lia 1998). The MB was established as a social movement 
and only later devoted its attention to politics in the strict sense. However, the 
relationship between social and political work was reversed when the Brotherhood was 
allowed to re-organise after Nasser’s repression and when its new leadership started to 
give priority to political participation and activities (al-Awadi 2004; Elshobaki 2005). 
Experience in the professional unions was of paramount importance for the training of 
a new generation of activists with the know-how it provided on the public 
administration, but also for the organization of social services at the national level. The 
often quoted episode of the Brothers’ efficient intervention after the Cairo earthquake of 
1992 was precisely an example of a rescue operation organised by the professional 
syndicates, mainly doctors and engineers. 
 
The ‘80s and ‘90s were also the decades of the revitalization of religious charities, 
partly spontaneous and partly encouraged by the regime. Starting with the ‘70s, the 
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of zakat funds which could be used to finance charitable associations (al-jam’iyya al-
khayriyya) providing basic social services to the population in health and education 
(Ben Nefissa et al.1995; Sullivan et al.1999). The regime was starting to search for a 
palliative for the otherwise potentially explosive socio-economic situation caused by the 
state’s increasing difficulty in providing social services (Pioppi 2007). What could be 
better for that purpose than a revalued religious charity, provided it was kept under 
state control and not politicised? The Muslim Brotherhood, of course, participated in the 
charity boom even though, with respect to the whole Islamic sector, the MB-controlled 
charities remained a minority.7 
 
When the new cycle of repression started in the mid-90s, the social activities of the MB 
were also heavily limited. Not only were the Brothers’ activities in the professional 
syndicates effectively reduced, but mosques and relative charitable associations 
started to be ‘(re)-nationalized’.8 It is difficult to provide a detailed reconstruction of the 
MB’s social activities after the mid-‘90s. Due to the tense relationship with the regime 
and the organization’s illegal status, no formal list is available to the public. Also, there 
is no central organization coordinating the Brotherhood’s social activities today, as was 
the case in the ‘30s and ‘40s. The charity section (Qism al-Birr) is mainly responsible 
for small-scale charitable activities, such as the distribution of food and other goods 
during Ramadan.9 All MB social activities are organized in the form of independent 
charitable associations (jam’iyya khayriyya) founded by individual members of the 
Brotherhood (often businessmen or well-off individuals) on a private basis. They have a 
‘spiritual’ link with the jama’a and use the Brotherhood’s informal network, but are both 
financially and administratively independent.10 
 
A charitable association is usually financed by an initial donation by the founder or a 
group of benefactors. But once the association starts functioning, it becomes self-
financing through a system of fees applied to the offered services, not unlike the private 
commercial sector. Furthermore, associations do not rely on volunteer work, but have 
waged employees who do not necessarily have to be members of the Brotherhood. 
The same thing goes for the users, who can be of any religion, sex and political 
affiliation. All charitable associations are under the supervision of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, which also grants the initial permission to operate, together with the Ministry of 
Health or Education, depending on the service provided. 
 
This somehow ‘decentralized’ or, rather, fragmented nature of the system, with no 
formal organization coordinating the different charities established and administered by 
the Brothers, has apparently been reinforced after the repression cycle of the ‘90s in 
parallel with a general reduction in social activities linked to the Muslim Brorherhood.11 
 
                                                 
7
 Sullivan et al. 1999; Author’s interviews Cairo, November 2010.  
8
 Kienle 2001; al-Awadi 2004. Author’s interviews, Cairo, November 2010. 
9
 Author’s interview with Dr Medhat ‘Asem, Director of Islamic Medical Association and member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, February 2010 and with Abdel Rahman al-Barr, Responsible of the Qism al-
Birr, Cairo, November 2010.  
10
 Ibid. and author’s interview with Hussam Tammam, Cairo, February and November 2010. 
11
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Today, in the field of health care there is only one Brotherhood-linked charity: the 
Islamic Medical Association (IMA, al-jam’iyya al-tibbiyya al-islamiyya12), which controls 
23 health units in all of Egypt and is currently building a central hospital in Madinat el-
Nasser, Cairo.13 In the education sector, there is no comparable association, but about 
30 independent schools scattered around the country.14 In general, these social 
activities are located in the bigger cities and in middle to upper class neighbourhoods, 
that is in the areas in which the potential donors and users live. Consequently, their 
target is not the most disadvantaged social strata, but the middle classes who do not 
want to use public services for low quality, but cannot afford the most expensive private 
services in health and education.15 
 
As a result of this brief analysis, it could be argued that Brotherhood-related social 
activities are extremely reduced today and certainly not enough to play a relevant role 
in mobilization. This is confirmed by the lack of an explicit political or social project 
linked to these associations. Of course, the regime has imposed specific limits on the 
possibility of political expression inside the charitable associations: associations cannot 
host political meetings or any other event or sign of politicization (banners), especially if 
Brotherhood-related. Yet, the result is that there is no way of distinguishing a 
Brotherhood-linked charitable association from a non-Brotherhood one, unless the 
names and political affiliation of the members of the administrative board are known. 
 
Muslim Brotherhood documents and political statements in recent years regarding 
health and education in Egypt reveal a programme that is not very detailed and lacking 
a clear distinction from the welfare policies and reforms presented by the regime. The 
Brotherhood is in favour of greater reliance on private providers of social services and 
partnership between the public administration and private entrepreneurs, both in terms 
of private investments and private charities to compensate the deficiencies of the 
welfare state. Even the wording of the programmes is very similar to those of the 
National Democratic Party.16 
 
In addition, the Brotherhood’s parliamentary activities on social issues are concentrated 
on general questions such as the fight against corruption or public inefficiency without, 
for instance, entering into the specifics of the reforms that are being carried out in the 
country and will have a great impact on Egypt’s future welfare system. This is even 
more striking given that there is a relatively large debate on and opposition bloc in the 
country to the health and education reforms. In the last five years, the opposition bloc 
has managed to inform Egyptian public opinion through events, media campaigns, 
                                                 
12
 The IMA was established in 1977 by Ahmad al-Malt, a doctor and vice general leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (http://www.imaegypt.net/p02.htm). 
13
 The IMA has 10 medical units in greater Cairo, the largest of which - the Faruq Hospital in Maadi – has a 
50-bed capacity. Author’s interviews with Dr Medhat ‘Asem, Director of IMA, Cairo, February and 
November 2010 and with the director and vice-director of the Faruq Hospital, Cairo, November 2010. 
14
 An example is the Madaris al-Rodwan in Madinat el-Nasser, Cairo. Author’s interview with the Director, 
Cairo, February 2010. 
15
 Author’s interviews, Cairo, February and November 2010. 
16
 See, for example, the Brotherhood campaign platform for the 2008 municipal 
(http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=16257) or for the 2010 parliamentary elections 
(http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/brotherhood-platform.pdf) on 
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publications and so on and to legally engage the government denouncing the 
unconstitutionality of the most extreme privatization measures, thus effectively reducing 
the regime’s freedom of action. The activists of the Committee for the Defence of the 
Right to Health17 lament the absence of the main opposition force, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in this important battle and accuse it of being 100% in favour of the 
regime policies.18 
 
On another front, the Brotherhood has been visibly absent from the workers’ protest 
movement in the last years.19 Besides some timid attempts to be represented in the 
workers’ trade unions in 1998, 2002 and again in 2006, there is no sign of an active 
role by the Brotherhood in organizing the workers’ strikes and demonstrations. In this 
respect, the Brotherhood has kept its traditional paternalist and corporatist approach 
aimed at reconciling capital and workers, more than taking advantage of social 
conflicts. The mainstream Sunni Islamist view, represented by the Brotherhood, is 
deeply hostile to class conflict. The ideal society is a harmonious one in which labour is 
productive and capitalists generous through charity (Beinin et al. 1998; Heanni et al. 
2009). 
 
To sum up, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities after the Nasser parenthesis 
have never reached the levels of diffusion and organization of the ‘30s and ‘40s. 
Furthermore, they are generally aimed at the middle to upper classes rather than the 
most disadvantaged social strata. Since the repression cycle that started in the ‘90s, 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities have been drastically reduced and do not 
seem to play a significant role in popular mobilization, not least for lack of a clear 





Today, after 40 years of co-existence with a (neo-)authoritarian regime, the Muslim 
Brotherhood is not in a good state of health. Besides an internal lack of coherence and 
unity, the Brotherhood does not have an original agenda, nor is it able to influence the 
national political arena very much. Most of the time, the jama’a reacts to the initiatives 
of the regime or other (weaker, but more active) opposition forces. In terms of social 
activities also, the Brotherhood’s reach has been severely reduced to the point that 
some argue that the only real links to popular constituencies till November 2010 were 
the members of parliament and their local offices, which were the only visible sign of 
the jama’a in many popular districts around the country.20 While this provides a further 
explanation for the MB’s unwillingness to boycott the November 2010 parliamentary 
elections, it also casts an even grimmer light on the current state of the organization. 
Certainly, the main explanation for the current state of affairs should be sought in the 
                                                 
17
 This is a network of NGOs working on health and sustainable development (http://www.ahedegypt.org). 
18
 Author’s interview with Dr. Muhammad Khalil, activist of the Committee for the Defence of the Right to 
Health, Cairo, Fenruary 2010. 
19
 al-Hamalawy, Hossam (2007), “Comrades and Brothers”, Middle East Report, n. 242, Spring, 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html; and author’s interview with Hossam Hamalawy, Cairo, 
November 2010. 
20
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regime’s repressive policies, but perhaps also in the excessive moderation of the 
Brotherhood which, not unlike other opposition forces in Egypt, is paying the price of 
survival in an authoritarian context. 
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